Digital Commons @ University of
Georgia School of Law
LLM Theses and Essays

Student Works and Organizations

1-1-1996

The Continental Moral Rights Doctrine and its Applicability in the
United States Copyright System
Oswaldo Jose Quintana
University of Georgia School of Law

Repository Citation
Quintana, Oswaldo Jose, "The Continental Moral Rights Doctrine and its Applicability in the United States
Copyright System" (1996). LLM Theses and Essays. 186.
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/stu_llm/186

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works and Organizations at Digital
Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in LLM Theses and Essays by
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have
benefited from this access For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

''

:i

^liil^iiip M.

THE
UNfTED STATES COPYRJGHT SYSTEM
IN

Oswalcta Jose Quintana

k

<ScAool of\%aitf

The University

UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA

LAW LIBRARY

3 8425 00347 3639

of

Georgia

Alexander Campbell King Law Library

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in

2013

http://archive.org/details/continentalmoralOOquin

THE CONTINENTAL MORAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICABILITY
IN THE UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT SYSTEM

by

OSWALDO JOSE QUINTANA
Abogado, Universidad Catolica Andres Bello,1991
Caracas, Venezuela

A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of
The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

MASTER OF LAWS

ATHENS, GEORGIA
1996

DkW LIBRARY

cmooin
UNIVFRSITY O^

—

THE CONTINENTAL MORAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICABILITY
IN THE UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT SYSTEM

by

OSWALDO JOSE QUINTANA

Approved

fVU^u

iv^i^q^

Date

Major Professor

Date

10/

Chairman, Reading Committee

Approved

f&dlU^l&tlL'
Dean of the Graduate School

Date

"bit

H

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CHAPTER
I

Introduction

1

II The Moral Rights Doctrine in the

Continental Law System and the

United States Copyright Legal
System

8

III The Protection of the Author's

Right of Personality in the United

States Copyright System
IV

44

Constitutionality of the
Continental Moral Rights Doctrine
in the United States Copyright

V

System

54

Conclusions

64

Bibliography

70

in

s

.

.

Chapter

I

Introduction

Many have seen the harmonization 1 of legal rules among
the countries as the fastest way to strengthen

international trade and the economic globalization process.
In the case of the United States,

the consolidation of this

new-world-economic-order seems to be paramount since the
United States is one of the major exporters of goods,
services, and copyrightable works in the world.
"in the latter half of the twentieth century,

Therefore,

international

copyright protection has become of much greater concern, as
the

[copyright]

instance,

industry has become supranational." 2

For

"in 1990, America's copyright industries recorded

$34 billion in foreign sales of records,

CDs,

computer

software, motion pictures, music, books, scientific
journals, periodicals, photographs, designs and pictorial

1

Thomas Dreier & Silke von Lewinski, The European Commission'
Activities in the Field of Copyright, 39 Copyright Society of USA L.J.
96 (1991) (discussing the framework for copyright harmonization within
the European Community, and the state of copyright harmonization by
presenting the legal instruments which so far have been adopted by the
European Council, or which have been proposed or announced by the
European Commission)
2

Laura A. Pitta, Economic and Moral Rights under U.S. Copyright Law:
Protecting Authors and Producers in the Motion Picture Industry, 12
Entert. & Sports Lawyer 3 at 3 (1995)
,

"

.

.

.

2

and sculptural works" 3

television,

record,

as another example,

;

"American film,

and music publishing companies now

derive 50 to 60 percent of their revenues from foreign

markets

.

4

In order to achieve an international framework which

could provide a minimum standard of protection for its

copyrightable works, in 1988, the United States acceded to
the Berne Convention 5 and Congress passed the Berne
,

Convention Implementation Act 6

;

moreover,

the

in 1994,

Congress enacted the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 7

,

which

includes the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of

Intellectual Property Rights

(TRIPs)

8
.

Arthur R. Miller, Extending Copyrights Preserves U.S. Culture,
Billboard, Jan 14, 1995, at 4.
3

Law and Business of the Entertainment
Donald E. Biederman et al
Industries at XV (Praeger ed.
2d ed. 1992)

4

.

,

,

Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
opened for signature Sept. 9, 1886 (last revised July 24, 1971),
reprinted in World Intellectual Property Organization, Guide to the
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
(Paris Act, 1971) (1978) [hereinafter Berne Convention]
5

6

Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C).

Stat. 2853
7

Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub.
[hereinafter GATT]

L.

No.

103-465,

108 Stat.

4 809

(1994)
8

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPs), reprinted in 33 Intl. Legal Mat. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter
TRIPs]
Under the 'TRIPs agreement " [m] embers shall comply with
articles 1-21 and the Appendix of the Berne Convention. However,
Members shall not have rights or obligations under this Agreement in
respect of the rights conferred under article 6bis of that Convention
or of the rights derived therefrom."
Id., art. 9.
Therefore, the
moral rights controversy arises only with regard to the Berne
1

.

Convention.

.

3

These treaties provide the highest copyright
Indeed,

protection available at the international level.

thanks to these international provisions, global piracy has

declined in the last years.

9

However,

the adherence of the

United States to these treaties has caused some controversy
since it "represents a major overhaul of federal law in

many spheres, not simply in copyright." 10

Thus,

this

adherence has brought a clash of the two systems involved
in the international copyright field

(the copyright and the

author's rights systems) and their philosophies.
instance, author's rights countries
Italy,

(i.e.,

and most Latin American countries)

11

France, Germany,

focus almost

exclusively on the individual creator (the author)
the common law countries

(i.e.,

For

12
,

while

United States and the

United Kingdom) focus on the balance between the author's

property rights and the people's right to learn.

13

"Global music piracy declined in 1993 for the first time in more than
Hollywood Reporter, Jun 9, 1994, at 1 cited by Donald
E. Biederman et al
Law and Business of the Entertainment Industries
at 7 (Praeger ed.
3d ed. 1996)
9

a decade." The

.

,

,

10 David

1385
1:L

Nimmer,

(1995)

Pitta,

The End of Copyright, 48 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1385, at

.

supra note

2.

12 Id.
13

"In this balance, the author's interests are generally considered
secondary to the public interest, sometimes even termed a 'means to an
end
For example, the courts at common law developed concepts such
as fair use to prevent the copyright monopoly from defeating its
purpose of ensuring that the public can make use of others'
creations." Harvard Law Review, Visual Artists' Rights in a Digital
Age, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 1977, at 1982-1983 (1994)
1

.

.

.

.

.

4

In the copyright field and within the Berne Convention

the differences between national laws and thus between the

author s rights approach and the copyright approach hardly
'

showed up for many years.

14

However, with the growth of

international trade, has also grown an international
emphasis on natural law (at least in the copyright field)
and its own deeply rooted principles of individual

recognition 15 without taking into consideration the public
interest.

Thus,

despite the efforts of the United States

in the international copyright field,

some countries in

Europe and in Latin America claim that the copyright system
in the U.S. does not protect in an appropriate way the

The United

personal rights of the authors or Moral Rights.

States is thus being forced by the civil law countries to

rethink its copyright laws in order to protect the
creator's noneconomic rights: the moral rights.

16

This critique and misunderstanding regarding the

protection of the Moral Rights in the U.S. is produced by a
wrong interpretation of the differences between the

American copyright system and the continental 11 author's
14 Margret

ed.

Moller, Author's Right or Copyright? at 11

(Gotzen ed.

,

1st

1989)

15 Pitta,

supra note

2,

at 3-4.

16 Pitta,

supra note

2,

at 4

17 The

Continental Law System or Civil Law Countries' legal system is
the legal framework derived from both the Code Napoleon (promulgated
in 1804) and the system of jurisprudence held and administered in the
Roman Empire, particularly as set forth in the compilation of
Justinian and his succesors
This Legal System has been assimilated
by most of the European and Latin American countries
.

5

Therefore,

rights system.

in the case of Moral Rights,

the

named international harmonization of legal rules seems to
be more difficult since there are philosophical and

constitutional differences between American copyright law
and the continental author's rights system.

Here,

the best

way to contribute to the strength of the harmonization

process is to understand and to consider the differences
that make the American copyright law a unique copyright

system among the other Berne Convention's countries.
the U.S. copyright system is unique because

Indeed,

power to enact copyright statutes is derived from Article
I,

Section

and,

8,

Clause

8

of the United States Constitution 18

Congress has found,

as the U.S.

;

"copyright is granted

in order to stimulate artistic creation and innovation for

the ultimate benefit of society, and that the grant of

copyright must always be designed to safeguard the public
interest in the free exchange of information." 19

other hand,

On the

"quite the opposite, the purest model of moral

rights, the Berne Convention, protects the author first and

foremost, without regard for the balance of society." 20

18 U.S.

Const, art. I, § 8, cl 8 states that Congress shall have the
power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
.

19 Legislative

Report on the Copyright Act of 1909, H.R.Rep. No. 2222,
60th Cong., 2d Sess
(1909) cited by Janine V. McNally, Congressional
Limits on Technological Alterations to Film: The Public Interest and
the Artists' Moral Right, 5 High Tech. L. J. 129, at 142 (1990)
.

.

20 Brett

Sirota, The Visual Artists Act: Federal Versus States Moral
Rights, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 461, at 468 (1992)
.

.

.

6

Consequently, this paper will emphasize that the U.S.

copyright system has made an effort for the past 206
years 21 to accomplish

a

balance between the authors'

property rights and the people
benefit of society.

Yet,

'

s

right to learn to the

this effort has been threatened

by section 106A of the Copyright Act 22 in order to extend
the scope of the moral rights protection.

23

An

understanding of the real objectives of the American
constitutional copyright provision 24

and the particular

,

characteristics of the U.S. copyright system will enable
Congress to avoid, in the moral rights field,

future

amendments to the American copyright law that may be
For instance, the idea-expression

unconstitutional.

dichotomy doctrine 25

,

which has been advanced as a means of

balancing competing interests of the First Amendment 26 and

21 Two

hundred and six years has been passed since the enactment of the
Copyright
first copyright act of the United States on May 31, 1790.
Act of 1790 1 Stat. 124; 1st. Cong., 2d Sess
c. 15 (1790).
22 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-803, at 106A (1976)
.

,

23 This

attempt has been helped by the argument of the Berne's Civil Law
Countries that the authors moral rights do not receive protection in
the U.S.
24 Copyright

Clause,

supra note 12.

25 The

idea-expression dichotomy principle was originated by the Supreme
Court in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (statuette lamp
bases held to be copyrightable, but the idea of a statuette used as
lamp based cannot be given copyright protection)
see also Zacchini v.
Scripps -Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 577-578 & n.13 (1977)
(the law places no restrain on the use of an idea or concept)
Baker
v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1880) (no copyright protection extended
to particular bookkeeping system)
;

;

26 U.S.

Const, amend.

I.

7

copyright, will be in danger because of the moral rights

doctrine

27
.

Accordingly, this paper analyzes whether the inclusion
of the moral right doctrine,

law countries,

in the U.S.

unconstitutional.

as known in the continental

statutory copyright system is

To start with the analysis of the

problem, this paper discusses the moral rights concept in

both the Continental author's rights and the American
copyright laws; the differences between both systems; the

inapplicability of the natural law concept in the U.S.
copyright system; and the American constitutional

requirement of balance between the author's property right
and the people's right to learn.
this analysis,

In order to proceed with

it considers the First Amendment and the

fair use doctrine as essential elements in the American

copyright laws which have not been contemplated neither by
the Berne Convention nor by the Continental Law System.

This paper concludes that the Moral rights concept, as

understood in the Civil Law Countries, may be
unconstitutional in the U.S. copyright system.

21 See

generally Stephen S. Zimmermann, A Regulatory Theory of
Copyright: Avoiding a First Amendment Conflict, 35 Emory L. J. 163
(1986)

.

.

Chapter II
The Moral Rights Doctrine in the Cont inental Law System and
the United States Copyright Legal System

I.- Copyright System V. Droit d' Auteur System

First of all,

it is important for the constitutional

analysis of the U.S. copyright law to discuss the

differences between the copyright system (common law) and
the Author's rights system (continental law or civil law

countries)

Those of us who come from France,

Italy,

or Germany have for many years used the term

when translating the notion 'droit d' auteur
autore',

'

derecho de autor' or

English Language.

'

'

Urheberrecht

Latin America
'copyright'

,

'

'

diritto di

into the

Even though the proper translation

should have been 'author's rights', for all of us
'copyright' is the term to use.

following excerpt from Moller,

As can be seen in the
"[a]nd as language has a

very seducing power, the fact that copyright is a different
system when compared with what is called 'author's rights'
was concealed.

For many years, there was an all in all

functioning coexistence of national laws based on the

9

author's right system or the copyright system within
Europe,

[Latin America],

and even throughout the world." 28

The national treatment concept,

as well as the minimun

rights concept of the Berne Convention, provided for

a

sufficient degree of international protection so that the

differences between national laws and thus between the
author's rights approach and the copyright approach did for

many years hardly show up. 29

However, the differences

between both systems are of special importance in the case
of Moral Rights.

As a result of the invention of the printing press by

Gutenberg in 1436,

"booksellers could copy authors'

manuscripts at a much faster rate.

Profits from the sales

of books helped the booksellers recover the cost of both

the authors' manuscripts and the printing press.

The

invention of the printing press also enabled 'pirate'

booksellers to copy books already published by 'legitimate
booksellers'.

These pirate booksellers were able to sell

these copied books at lower prices since they could avoid

paying for the authors' manuscripts.

Neither the authors

who had sold their manuscripts nor the legitimate

booksellers had any legal recourse against these pirate
booksellers, and it became increasingly clear that some

28 M611er,

supra note 10, at 11

29 M611er,

supra note 10, at 11

.

.

.

'

10

Therefore,

protection was necessary." 30

"the

indeed,

pressure for protection came not from authors but from
booksellers, whose pecuniary interest was most threatened

by the pirate booksellers" 31

;

consequently,

"publishers

created copyright as a private -law concept designed to
benefit themselves, not authors." 32

However,

the

governments soon became aware of the copyright
device of censorship.

33

'

power as

s

a

Thus, when the protection of works

became a medium not only to protect the economic interests
of authors but a medium to guarantee both the publishers

profits and governments control over the press, two

differents schools of thought emerged.

34

One school, natural law, was assimilated into the

civil law countries and promoted especially by France and
This theory (the natural rights approach adopted

Germany.

30 Peter

Burger, The Berne Convention: Its History and Its Key Role in
Future,
the
3 J.L. & Tech. 1, at 3-4
(1988)

31 Id.
32 L.

Rev.
33

,

at

Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,
1,

at 20

See id.

34,,

4

,

4

Vand.

L.

(1987)

at 24-25

When the focus of copyright switched from the bookseller to the
author, a philosophical debate emerged as to the origin of the
right ... [s] ince the booksellers were not creators of a work, their
only interest was pecuniary. Authors, on the other hand, created the
books; the ideas belonged to them and emanated from them.
Thus, many
philosophers argued that copyright should protect both the authors
economic and personal interests, and that those interests should be as
unlimited as possible. These philosophers pointed to natural law as
the basis of authors' rights... The natural rights approach, however,
was partially rejected in Great Britain and the United States."
Burger, supra note 30, at 5 (emphasis supplied)

"

.

11

in the continental law system)

sustains that the "authors

always retained their personal or moral rights even if they
sold their economic rights to publishers

.

The Author's

3B

Rights or Droit d' Auteur system also sustains that the

inviolability of an author's personality is the ultimate
On the other hand, the ultimate principle of

principle.

American copyright law is "to promote the Progress of
Science" 36 or,

in other words,

to secure the progress of

the society.

The influence of the natural law concept upon the

French Declaration of the Rights of Man has been widely
acknowledged. 37

Furthermore,

"subsequent national and

international charters and declarations have continued to

ground their existence in natural law and natural rights
concepts.

Among these, one may find the Berne Convention

and its doctrine of moral rights of authors." 38

The Berne

Agreement, for example, has recived formal recognition as
one part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
3 5

Burger, supra note 30, at

36 U.S.

Const, art.

I,

§

8,

39

6

cl

.

8.

See supra note 18.

37 Robert

C. Hauhart, Natural Law Basis for the Copyright Doctrine of
Droit Moral, 30 The Catholic Lawyer 53, at 62 (1985)
.

3S Id.
39 Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, General Assembly of the United
" (1) Everyone has
Nations (1948). Article 27 reads:
the right freely
to participate in the culture of the community, to enjoy the arts and
to share in the scientific advancement and its benefits.
(2) Everyone has the right to protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientific, literary, or artistic
production of which he is the author." Cited by Hauhart, supra note
37,

at 62.

12

The continental law system based on natural law
concepts,

is

"less likely to find authors'

rights

outweighed by the public's interest in easy access to
literary and artistic works." 40

Moreover, a natural rights

approach is logically more consistent not only with
international copyright protection 41 but also with the
interest of publishers. 42
The other School, the Anglo-American copyright law,
was assimilated into the common law countries.

The

author's copyright was merely conceived as an intangible
right granted by statute to the author, with the sole and

exclusive privilege of multiplying copies of his creation
and publishing and selling it. 43

Even though both American

and English copyright laws have the same roots, American

copyright law is more than a mere device for the protection
of authors rights.

40 Burger,

American copyright law is a

supra note 30, at

7

41

"Natural rights, by their nature, are not bound by national borders;
they adhere to every living person. Thus, it follows that those
countries which based their copyright laws on natural rights
principles were the first countries to extend their laws not only to
their own citizens engaged in creating literary and artistic works,
but also to citizens of foreign countries engaged in similar creative
endeavors.
This is not true in Anglo-American countries, where
copyright is considered a statutorily-created privilege for the
economic benefit of copyright owners. As such, Anglo-American
countries could limit copyright protection to domestic authors if they
felt it was economically prudent to do so, and such a decision would
certainly be consistent with their underlying copyright philosophy."
Burger, supra note 30, at 7.
42 Burger,
43 See

supra note 30, at

7.

Black's Law Dictionary 336

(6th ed.

1990).

13

constitutional command:

"To promote the Progress..." 44

.

This command is precisely what the civil law countries and
the Berne Convention have forgotten and/or misunderstood.

Moreover,

this command is precisely the idea that some

publishers are trying to weaken by supporting natural law
concepts like the moral rights doctrine. 45

Thus,

in the

American copyright law, the economic protection provided to
the owner of the copyright is the means of the copyright

law not its goal. 46
In addition,

the American copyright system found that

there are several rights involved in the copyright field:
"[t]he author's act of publication thus brings into play
the rights of others." 47

the Framers of

In consequence,

the Constitution faced the fact that two different natural

law concepts came into conflict:

that of the author's

natural property right, and the people's natural right to
learn;

44 See

"[c]opyright thus is, and can be, only a positive-

Copyright Clause, supra note 18.

45

"There are two explanations for the continued claims as to the
author's natural -law right. One is that the theory is to the
advantage of publishers, whose ulterior motives are disguised by a
false implication that the theory is primarily to benefit the author.
The other is that writers generally treat the issue of the natural -law
basis for a right and the issue of the scope of that right as being
the same.
The assumption seems to be that if the author's copyright
is a natural -law right, it provides the author with absolute dominion
over the work and exists in perpetuity." L. Ray Patterson, Copyright
and 'the Exclusive Right' of Authors, 1 J. Intell Prop. L. 1, at 24
.

(1993)

.

"Id.
*7

Id.

,

at 25.

.

14

law concept, because only a positive-law concept can serve
to mediate two natural -law rights.

Professor Patterson says,

1'

48

Therefore, as

"the Copyright Clause makes the

point by recognizing the natural-law right of the people to
learn as well as the natural -law right of the author to

gain a profit.

Thus, we come to the fundamental point.

American copyright, whatever its basis, cannot co-exist as
a

natural-law right in a society where learning is a

natural-law right and the public domain has a natural -law
basis.

"

49

In conclusion,

it can be said that the American

copyright system is a statutory law where "the statutes did
not codify natural law; they replaced it and created in

authors an exclusive, but time-limited, right to prevent

others from copying their works without authorization." 50
The purpose of this exclusive right is to encourage the

production of science and useful arts 51 as a means to

promote the progress 52 and the welfare of the nation.

48 Patterson,

supra not 45, at 26

4S Id.
50 Burger,

51 Supra
52 Id.

supra note 30, at

note 18

6.

15

II.- Moral Rights Definition in the Continental Legal

System

Since the main purpose of this paper is to analyze

whether the moral rights doctrine is unconstitutional in
the context of the American copyright law,

it

is necessary

to discuss the elements that constitute this doctrine.

The moral rights doctrine has its origin in the

natural-law theories, the basis of the continental author's
rights system.

Thus, besides economic rights,

rights also include moral rights.

53

author's

These rights mainly

include the right to claim authorship and to object to any
distortion, mutilation or other modification of a work

which would be prejudicial to the author's honor or
reputation.

54

Moral rights is a civil law concept based on

the view that an artist's creation is an extension of his

personality. 55

53 For

instance, the French law of authors recognizes two kinds of
rights:
a) Economic Rights:
the right to exploit the work
commercially, and b) Personal Rights: moral rights or droit moral,
rights deriving from the work as an expression of the author's
personality.
See Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27
Hastings L. J. 1023, 1025 (1976)
.

54 Article 6bis (1) of the Berne Convention states:
"(1) Independently
of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of
the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said
work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation."
55 See

generally Russell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral
Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in France and the United
States, 28 Bull. Copyright Soc'y. 1, 11-14 (1980).

>
In examining the body of the continental copyright law

(author's rights system),

specific rights:

the experts have isolated four

1.- The Right of Disclosure,

2.- The

Right of Attribution, 3.- The Right of Integrity (against

mutilation and distortion)

,

and

4

.

-

The Right of

Retraction.
"The right of disclosure recognizes that the author

generally is the sole judge of whether and when his work
may be brought to the knowledge of the public.

The right

of attribution gives the author the right to have his work

attributed to him (or not, as the case where he wishes to
be anonymous or to employ a pseudonym)

.

The right of

integrity prohibits any change in a work without the
author's consent.

And,

the right of retraction permits the

author, after publication, to stop the further distribution
of his work or to make changes in it." 56

In addition,

pursuant to the Author's rights system, the moral rights
are perpetual, inalienable, and imprescriptible.

57

Within the Moral Rights Theory, two different schools
of thought can be distinguished.

These postulates emerged

concerning the legal nature of artists' rights:

one of

them espousing a monist theory of rights, and the other a
56 Edward

J. Damich, The Right of Personality:
A Common-Law Basis for
the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 Ga. L. Rev. 1 at 7
,

(1988)
57 For

.

example, the 1957 French Law declares that the droit moral is
perpetual, inalienable, and imprescriptible.
C. civ. art. 543, Code
Penal arts. 425-429 (French Law of March 11, 1957 on literary and
artistic property) cited by Damich, supra note 52, at7.

.

.

17

dualist theory.

58

The monist theory,

"influenced by the

writings of Kant, held that authors had

a

unitary set of

rights in their works that were fundamentally personal.
As personal rights,

these rights were considered

inalienable, nonwaivable, and nonassignable.
the dualist theory 60

hand,

Hegel,

5

,

On the other

influenced by the writings of

argued that authors had two distinct interests in

their works, one personal and the other economic.

Each of

these interests was protected by a legally distinct set of
rights.

"

61

In this point,

it can be seen that neither the monist

nor the dualist theories take into consideration the

relation that exists between the protection of the author's
rights and the public's access to information and, thus,

knowledge
In accordance with the moral right theory,

four basic moral rights

among the

(disclosure, attribution,

58 Dane

S. Ciolino, Moral Rights and Real Obligations
A Property-law
Framework for the Protection of Authors' Moral Rights, 6 9 Tul L. Rev.
:

.

935,

at 939

59 This
60

(1995)

monist approach flourished in Germany.

Id.

"The first French codification of Moral -Rights doctrine reflected the
triumph of the dualist theory.
That law, enacted on March 11, 1957,
codified judge-made moral-rights doctrine to provide authors with an
'exclusive incorporeal property right in the work' that included
attributes 'of an intellectual and moral nature as well as attributes
of an economic nature'.
The rights of an 'economic nature' included
rights similar to those possessed by the copyright holder under
copyright law.
The rights of a 'moral nature' included authors' moral
rights (droit moral)."
Id., at 939-940.
61 Id.

:
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and retraction)

integrity,

not perpetual.

,

"Apparently,

only the right of retraction is
the thinking is that no one

but the artist is capable of knowing when to withdraw
work; thus,

rights

the right terminates with the author's

Nevertheless, since the authors are human

death." 62
beings,

a

the perpetual characteristic of the other moral

(disclosure, attribution, and integrity)

seems to

exist in order to benefit the position of those who would
like to control the dissemination of information.

63

Moreover, since the authors are the owners of their ideas

under the continental moral rights doctrine, the perpetual
right of integrity may allow the control of political ideas
for an indefinite time. 64

For example,

in a civil law

country, after the death of an author, who has no heirs,
the government will become trustee of the author's

property.

Then,

62 Christine

that government would possess the author's

Chinni Droit D'Auteur Versus the Economics of
Copyright: Implications for American Law of Accession to the Berne
Convention, 14 New Eng. L. Rev. 145, 149 (1992)
L.

,

.

63 See,

e. g., Swedish Law on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works,
Law No. 729, Dec. 30, 1960, art. 51 (Swed.) trans, as amended in 1991
in 27 Copyright (WIPO)
Swedish Text 1-01, at 8 (art. 51) (Sept. 1991)
(permitting government, after the author's death, to enjoin
performance or reproduction "in a manner which violates cultural
interests"
,

)

64

.

"(T)he Netherlands decidedly does not belong to the group of
countries which recognize an eternal moral right, with the State
acting as a watchdog over the integrity of works, as well as with all
the ensuing dangers for freedom of expression and information."
Herman Cohen Jehoram, National Report on Moral Rights in the
Netherlands, in ALAI Congress.
Cited by Adolf Dietz, ALAI Congress
Antwerp 1993 The Moral Right of Author: Moral Rights and the Civil
Law Countries, 19 Colum.-VLA J. L. & Arts 199, at 215 (1995).
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ideas,

and the society may have no access to them.

6

Therefore, another counterweight to droit moral is to be

found in the necessity of guaranteeing public access to
others'

ideas.

III.- Avoiding the Moral Rights Controversy in the

International Trade Field.

It is worth

mentioning here that during the

negotiations of both the TRIPs and the NAFTA 66 Agreements,
the United States succeeded in avoiding a dispute that
the moral rights protection.

seemed to be irresolvable:

67

Under the Agreement on Trade -Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs),

"

[m]

embers shall

comply with articles 1-21 and the Appendix of the Berne
Convention.

However, Members shall not have rights or

obligations under this Agreement in respect of the rights

conferred under article 6bis [moral rights]

6B

of that

65

"The case of the cancellation of a grant from the Danish Film
Institute for the production of a film on the life of Jesus Christ on
the ground that the film would be an infringement of the moral rights
of the authors of the Bible, a case which finally was decided on other
grounds, has demonstrated the danger of [the moral rights doctrine] ."
Id.

,

at 214.

66 North American Free Trade Agreement, 8 December
1992, Canada-MexicoUnited States, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
See also:
North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, S.C. 1993, c. 44;
North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No.

103-182,
67 See

107 Stat.

2057

(1993)

generally Jorg Reinbothe

the Negotiations on TRIPs
68 See

supra note 50.

.

&

Anthony Howard, The State of Play in
5 EIPR 157 (1991).

(GATT/'Uruguay Round),
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Convention or of the rights derived therefrom." 69
Moreover, article

(2)

9

of TRIPs also considered the

American idea-expression-dichotomy principle stating that
"

[c]

opyright protection shall extend to expressions and not

to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or mathematical

This provision serves the

concepts as such." 70

dissemination of ideas and technology throughout the world,
and principally benefit developing countries.
the North American Free Trade

In the same way,

Agreement
(2)

(NAFTA),

states that

"

in its part 6,

[n]

chapter 17, annex 1701.3

otwithstanding article 1701

(2)

(b) 71

,

this Agreement confers no rights and imposes no obligations

on the United States with respect to article 6bis
rights]

of the Berne Convention,

that article.

"

[moral

or the rights derived from

72

In conclusion,

the moral rights controversy arises

only with regard to the Berne Convention.

Therefore,

it is

necessary to discuss the moral rights doctrine under the
Berne Convention.

69 Supra
'

70

Id.

,

note
art.

71 Article

8,

9

art.

(2)

9

(1)

.

.

1701 (2) (b) of the NAFTA Agreement states:
"[t]o provide
adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual
property rights, each Party shall, at a minimum, give effect to this
Chapter and to the substantive provisions of:
(b) the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1971
(Berne Convention).
See supra note 62.
72

Id.
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IV.- Moral Rights definition in the Berne Convention for

the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works

The Berne Convention 73 is an international treaty that

provides a means for reciprocal copyright protection and

a

framework of minimun standards of rights in each of the

countries signing it.

"The Berne Convention,

to national treatment principles,

in addition

requires that certain

well -specif ied minimum rights be guaranteed under the

domestic laws of each member." 74

Thus,

the Berne

Convention supplies the highest form of international
copyright protection available in the international area.
The purpose of this treaty is found in its article

1

which stated that the Union was formed for the protection
of the rights of authors.

It is clear that this focus was

indicative of the droit d'auteur countries'

(continental-

natural-law system) influence in drafting the Convention.

75

A.- The Approach to the Harmonization

The intention of the Berne Convention was "to

establish certain minimum standards which all contracting
countries were required to recognize and later to expand
73

Supra note

5

74 Carlos
3

J. Moorhead, The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1987,
J.L.& Tech. 187, 188 (1988).

75 Burger,

supra note 30, at 16.
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these minimum requirements to achieve the ultimate

objective of

a

uniform international law of copyright.

Individual countries could give foreign authors greater

protection than required by the Convention, but in no case
could they give less protection." 76

In addition,

"the

fundamental principle of the Berne Convention was, and

Under the national

continues to be, national treatment.

treatment concept, Berne signatories grant authors who are

nationals of other Berne countries the same protection they

accord to their own nationals.

National treatment is

significant because it ensures nondiscriminatory treatment
for authors in all contracting states." 77

Because of the philosophical elements that are

involved in the moral rights doctrine,

"there is no

unanimity even within the group of civil law countries as
to how far moral rights protection extends and what

individual faculties it should cover.

However, unanimity

exists, at least in principle, as far as the paternity

right and the integrity right are concerned." 78

For that

reason, the Berne Convention requires, as a minimum

standard,

the protection of the paternity and the integrity

moral rights.

79

Nevertheless, since civil law countries

have higher standards in the field of moral rights than the
76 Burger,

77 Id.

,

supra note 30, at 16.

at 16-17.

78 Dietz,
79 See

supra note 60, at 219.
article 6bis of the Berne Convention,

supra note 50

"
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United States, they feel that their authors are not
the

Moreover,

receiving the same fair treatment.

continental law countries feel that their authors' works
are exposed to the American fair use doctrine 80

therefore, their works can be used,

;

and,

in the United States,

without the payment of the royalties due them.

This fear

is produced by the misunderstanding of the fair use

doctrine in the Continental Law.

For this reason,

the

publishing companies from the civil law countries would
like to see the scope of the moral rights extended in the

United States and the concept of moral rights, as it is

understood in the continental system, incorporated into the
legal system of the United States.

In this way they may be

able to prevent the application of the fair use doctrine.
It seems to be that the international harmonization of

the moral rights rules is complete since there is a minimum

standard regarding the paternity and the integrity rights.
However, there are two problems at this point:

First,

the

civil law countries insist that the United States does not

fulfill the Berne Convention's moral rights standards; and
80 The

fair use doctrine is "a privilege in others than the owner of a
copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner
without the owner's consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to
the owner." Black's Law Dictionary 598 (6th ed. 1990)
The fair use
doctrine has statutory recognition in section 107 of the Copyright Act
of 1976, 17 U.S.C §§ 101-803, at § 107 (1976).
Section 107 states:
"Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair use
of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or
phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use)
scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of coptright
.

,

.

.
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second,

there is a conflict between the moral rights,

least in reference to the integrity right,

at

and both the

principles on which the copyright system is based and the
First Amendment

81

B.- Moral Rights in the Berne Convention

The original Berne Convention was signed on September
9,

1886 in Berne,

Switzerland.

82

During the Rome Revision

Conference of 1928 a new set of rights was created:
droit moral or moral rights.

the

That was the first time that

the Berne Convention recognized the personal element which

already existed in most continental European countries.
In the international field,

83

the most commonly known

expression of the protection of moral rights of authors is
the formula adopted by the Berne Convention at the Revision

Conference of Rome.

Thus,

article 6bis of the Treaty

covers two specific rights, namely the right to claim

authorship of the work or paternity right and the right of

81 For

the analysis of this point,

82 Since

see Chapter IV of this paper.

its original signing, the Convention has been revised five
times and amended twice.
The subsequent revisions and amendment are
as follows:
Additional Act and Declaration of Paris, done on May 4,
1896; Act of Berlin Revision done on November 13, 1908; Additional
Protocol of Berne, done on March 20, 1914; Rome Revision, done on June
2, 1928; Brussels Revision, done on June 26, 1948; Stockholm Revision,
done on July 14, 1967; and Paris Revision of 1971.
See Burger, supra
note 30.
83

Id.

,

at 28.

.

integrity.

84

However,

this provision is

a

minimalist

approach if we compare this with the protection available
in France,

Germany,

Latin American countries.

C-

Spain,

Italy,

and other European and

85

Does the United States fulfill the Berne Convention's

Moral Rights Standards?

Article 6bis of the Berne Convention states:

Independently of the author's economic rights, and even
after the transfer of the said rights,

the author shall

have the right to claim authorship of the work and to
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification
of,

or other derogatory action in relation to,

which would be prejudicial to his honor or

work,

reputation.

86

This article recognizes two differents rights:

integrity right 87 and the attribution right 88
84 See

the said

.

the

These rights

supra note 50.

85 Dietz,
86 Berne

supra note 60, at 200.
Convention, art. 6bis,

supra note

5.

87

"The semi-official guide published by the Berne Convention's
secretariat comments that this [integrity right] is very elastic and
leaves a good deal of latitude to the courts." World Intellectual
Property Organization, Guide to the Berne Convention, 42 (1978) cited
by Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 8D.01[B]
(Vol.
88

2

1996)

"The [semi-official] guide [published by the Berne Convention's
secretariat] elaborates three branches of the Berne 'paternity' right,
i.e., to assert that the author is the work's creator; to publish
anonymously or pseudonymous ly, with the option of later changing his

26

constitute

part of the author's rights definition of the

a

moral rights.

Thus,

the language of this article

establishes the Berne minimum.

89

The United States officially became a member of the

Berne Convention on March

1,

U.S. was the product of two acts:
of the Convention

(on Oct.

The adherence of the

198 9.

31,

the Senate ratification

1988)

90
;

and the signing by

President Reagan of the Berne Convention Implementation Act
of 1988.

91

Convention,

After the adherence of the U.S. to the Berne
further incentive for the recognition of moral

rights arose since article 6bis of the Convention required
the recognition of those rights.

92

However, the Berne

Convention Implementation Act did not provide for federal
moral rights protection.

The United States provided a

convenient rationale for this position by concluding that
"[there is]

substantial protection.

..

for the real

equivalent of moral rights under statutory and common law
in the U.S." 93

Moreover, the legislation by which the

mind and abandoning anonymity; and to prevent use of his name with
reference to a work that he did not create." Id.
89 Id.

90 See

generally Jane C. Ginsburg & John M. Kernochan, One Hundred and
Two Years Later: The U.S. Joins the Berne Convention, 13 Colum.-VLA J.
L. & Arts 1 (1988)
.

91 Berne

Convention Implementation Act of 1988, supra note

92 Damich,

supra note 52, at

6.

3.

93 Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group
on U.S. Adherence to the
Berne Convention, 10 Colum.-VLA J. L. & Arts 1 (513), 35 (547) (1986)
cited by Id.

.
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United States acceded to the Berne Convention specifically
states that the Treaty itself is not self -executing 94

,

meaning that the terms of the Convention do not require new
legislation implementing specific provisions of the
Convention.
The issue of moral rights was debated vigorously

before the accesion to the Berne Convention.

The final

position was that U.S. could qualify for Berne moral rights
standards on the basis of existing common law rules, and
that "the obligations of the U.S. under the Berne

Convention may be performed only pursuant to appropriate
domestic law.

"

95

Because of the philosophical differences between the

American copyright law and the Author's rights system which
supports the moral rights doctrine, the U.S. consistently
has refused to recognize moral rights, as such, but through

various common law doctrines, such as defamation,
misrepresentation, the right of privacy, the right of
publicity, unfair competition, and federal claims such as

section 43

(a)

of the Lanham act 96

upheld claims of moral right. 97

94 Supra

note

6,

§

2

(1)

95 Supra

note

6,

§

2

(2)

96 Lanham

Act,

15 U.S.C.A.

,

courts frequently have

Therefore,

it can be said

§§ 1051 et seq.

97 See generally
Damich, supra note 56; and Sophia Davis, State Moral
Rights Law and The Federal Copyright System, 4 Cardozo Arts & Ent L.
.

J.

233

(1985)

.
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that the U.S. does fulfill the minimum standard of moral

rights' protection which the Berne Convention requires.

However, despite the fact that the U.S. considers itself
(on the basis

qualified for Berne's moral rights standards
of existing state and federal remedies)

"moral rights

,

advocates have continued to push for federal laws which

provide more thorough compliance with the Berne
Convention.

,l98

1.- The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990

(VARA)

99

Despite their inability to obtain further federal
moral rights provision, supporters of artists' moral rights
had some success in the U.S. since the Congress passed the
Visual Artists Rights Act in 1990

(VARA)

.

The creation of

VARA was made easier by the United States' accession to the
Berne Convention.

100

However, the scope of the VARA is

limited because it only applies to visual artists' moral
rights 101
98 Sirota,

and only to certain kind of works.

,

411,

100 Sirota,

101 17

Therefore,

supra note 20, at 465.

"Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C.
301,

102

412,

501,

506

(Supp.

Ill 1992)

§§ 101,

106A,

107,

113,

[hereinafter VARA]

supra note 20, at 464.

U.S.C.

§

106A,

see supra note 99.

102

"Artists were given both integrity and attribution rights under
but with several limitations.
The statute applied only to
'original paintings and drawings ... sculpture, prints and noncommercial
photographs'. Also the works must be originals.
Copies are only
allowed 'in signed, consecutively numbered, limited editions of no
more than 200 copies.
The rights are not perpetual and do not last
[VARA]

'

.
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as it is suggested by Professor Damich,

the Visual Artists

Rights Act does not fully meet article 6bis of the Berne

Convention 103

and,

;

for this reason,

the supporters of the

moral rights doctrine insist on the expansion of the Visual

Artists Rights Act's scope.

104

Contrary to the position of

those who support VARA, there are commentators who "lament
the passage of VARA as erroneous on grounds such as private

property and First Amendment free speech rights." 105
The Committee for America's Copyright Community (CACC)

suggests "that the reason for the concerns of Congress and
the limitations provided in VARA is regard for the

objective of the U.S. Constitution's copyright clause,

ensuring public availability of a broad array of
intellectual and artistic works." 106

Moreover,

the Congress

as long as copyright protection.
Rather, they last only as long as
the artist lives.
In addition, all works made 'for hire' are

excluded." Karen Y. Crabbs The Future of Authors' and Artists' Moral
Rights in America, 26 Beverly Hills B.A.J. 167, 172 (1992)
,

.

103

"Professor Damich has also written on the subject of the United
States adherence to the Berne Convention with respect to article 6bis
Furthermore, he testified at the subcommittee's hearings regarding
United States adherence to the Berne Convention
See Edward J.
Damich, Moral Rights in the United States and Article 6bis of the
Berne Convention: A Comment on the Preliminary Report of the Ad Hoc
Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 Colum.VLA
J.L. & Arts 655 (1986)
cited by Dana L. Burton, Artists' Moral
Rights: Controversy and the Visual Artists Rights Act, 48 SMU L. Rev.
.

639,

664

(1995)

104

.

"Commentators who support moral rights protection for artists are
generally in favor of expansion of these rights beyond the narrow
confines of VARA." Id., at 655.
10S Id.
106 Id.

at 656.

.

.
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made clear in the enactment of the Berne Convention

Implementation Act and the Visual Artists Rights Act that
its intention was not to extend the moral rights

protection.

107

Thus,

the Congress concluded that the moral

rights could be protected by common law doctrines.
In fact,

besides the common law doctrines

(i.e.,

defamation, unfair competition,, privacy right,

and

publicity right) and federal statutes (i.e.,

43

§

108

(a)

of

the Lanham Act) which are used to protect the moral rights
in the U.S.,

there are nine states that have enacted laws

protecting the rights of integrity and attribution for
visual artists.

109

Thus,

these laws were cited by Congress

as part of the reason why the United States already

complied with article 6bis of the Berne Convention.
Therefore,

110

it is obvious that the Congress enacted the

Visual Artists Rights Act in order to please the authors'
and publishers' groups who support moral rights legislation
in doing so,

in U.S.;

it seems that Congress made no

further considerations of VARA's effects on the First

Amendment

107 Burton,
108 See

supra note 103, at 656.

supra note 93

109 Nine

States have moral rights laws:
California, Connecticut,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
and Rhode Island.
See Nimmer, supra note 87, at § 8D.02[A]
.

110 See

S.

Rep. No.

352,

100th Cong., 2d Sess

.

9-10

(1988).
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The Visual Artists Rights Act grants to the artists

both the right of attribution and the right of integrity;
however, VARA does not define what third-party's conduct

could violate the provisions in the statute.

111

Thus,

as

Kathryn A. Kelly said:
"

[The Visual Artists Rights Act] merely grants the

artist the rights, with no affirmative language

prohibiting the owner or beholder from conduct that
would constitute a violation of the artist s rights.
'

While moral rights are indeed intangible property
rights, a vague prohibition against prejudicing an

artist's honor or reputation leaves an owner or

beholder without guidance as to what constitutes such
prejudice.

The First Amendment is implicated here

because an owner or beholder may be prohibited from
engaging in protected First Amendment speech.

The Act

could chill speakers from engaging in expressive
speech or acts that might prejudice an artist's
repu ta ti on

"

112

.

li:L

Kathryn A. Kelly, Moral Rights and the First Amendment:
Putting
Honor Before Free Speech?, 11 U. Miami Ent & Sports L. Rev. 211
.

(1994)

.

112 Kelly,

supra note 111.
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V.- Moral Rights Definition in the United States Copyright

System

Many have said that the moral rights are not

appropriately protected in the United States.
Nevertheless, in order to answer whether the moral rights
are actually protected in the U.S.

legal system, we have to

determine whether or not there is such a concept as moral
rights in the American copyright system.
In the Continental legal system,

the rights of an

author can be summarized as falling into two categories:
the economic rights and the right of personality or moral

However, the precise meaning of the author's moral

rights.

rights could be different from one nation to another

according to the legal system adopted for each legislation.
Moreover, the author's moral rights is not a concept that
can define a single right, yet it is a notion that includes
a collection of rights

which protect the personality of the

author as he has expressed it in his work.

113

In the United States copyright system,

the Copyright

Act of 1976 recognizes the economic rights in section
106.

114

In addition,

the Copyright Act also recognizes some

authors' personal rights in section 106A.

113 Hauhart,

114 17
115 Id.

U.S.C.
,

§

supra note 37, at 56.
§

106A.

106

(1976).

Also see supra notes 99 and 102.

115

However, there

.
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are neither a statutory nor a common law set of rights
Indeed,

named as moral rights.

"

[t]he adjective

has no precise English equivalent,

'moral'

although 'spiritual',

non-economic' and 'personal' convey something of the

intended meaning." 116

Thus,

in the U.S.

legal system

,

"the

phrase 'personal rights' more accurately translates the
concept of droit moral than does 'moral rights', and it is
more suggestive of the theoretical basis that underlies the

Accordingly, we can use in the U.S. copyright

concept." 117

system the phrase personal rights instead of moral rights.
The idea that connects American right of personality

and the concept of moral rights in the Continental legal

system is that the works are expressions of the creative

personality of the authors, and insofar as these works
represent the authors' personalities, the works should be
protected.

118

Thus, courts in the United States have

protected the authors' personality interests in their
works.

119

This protection has become available through the

creative use of states common law, and the Federal Unfair

Competition Law (Lanham Act)
116 Nimmer,

supra note 87, at

§

117 Damich,

supra note 56, at

6.

118 Damich,

supra note 56, at

4

120
.

Therefore, the only way,

8D.01[A].

119 See

Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc., 538 F.2d 14
(2nd Cir. 1976)
WGN Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video,
Inc., 693 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982).
Follet v. Arbor House Publishing
Co., 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
.

120 Davis,

supra note 97, at 234.

.
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not only to fulfill the Berne Convention standards

(in the

moral rights issue) but also to actually protect the

personal rights of authors in the U.S. copyright system,

is

through the common law doctrines and federal statutes that

already protect the authors' personal interests in their
works

A.- Conflict Among Different Kinds of Rights

Courts have seen the need to protect the link that
exists between the artist and his work by recognizing the

personal rights of authors (moral rights) through the use
of states common law actions

(i.e.,

privacy, and breach of contract)

defamation,

and section 43

Lanham Act (federal unfair competition)

.

invasion of
(a)

of the

However, the

conflict remains regarding the other rights involved in the

copyright field, which must be balanced.

Thus,

it is also

important to balance the three policies embraced in the

Copyright Clause.
Besides the personal rights of authors, there are two
more rights that must be considered after the publication
of the work:

second,

the author's economic rights; and

First,

the people's right to learn.

Furthermore, the

three policies that we can recognize in the Copyright

Clause 121 are:

12

^.S. Const, art.

First,

I,

§

8,

the promotion of learning; second,

cl

.

8.

See supra note 18.
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the protection of the public domain; and third,

the

protection for limited times of the author's rights.

1.- The necessity of balance:

122

Natural Law v. Positive

Law, and the personal rights

As it was said before,

the only method available to

balance two different natural laws in conflict, without

placing one above the other, is through the creation of

positive-law doctrine.

123

a

In the case of the American

copyright system, the Constitution is the foundation in

which the positive-copyright-law doctrine is based.
However, the Copyright Clause was not enough to ensure the

complete balance required by the important rights involved.
Therefore, the ultimate goal of the copyright

(to promote

the progress by promoting the public's access to the works
in order to disseminate knowledge)

is clearly meaningless

if with this freedom of access to the knowledge does not

also come the freedom to express the ideas and the

knowledge which is guaranteed by the First Amendment. 124

122 Patterson,
123 See

124

In

supra note 45, at 24

supra notes 45-49.

"The First Amendment's free speech protections prohibit the
inhibition of the free flow of information. The Copyright Clause
provides a limited yet exclusive statutory monopoly to authors for
their works for the explicit purpose of promoting science and useful
arts.
Thus, a copyright may conflict with the Constitution's
protections of free speech when copyright is used to inhibit the free
flow of information." Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 164.

-

.
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this way, both the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment

ensure not only the balance among the different rights

involved in the dissemination of knowledge but also

guarantee the final goal of the American copyright
system.

125

Therefore,

if the Continental -moral -rights

doctrine is used to protect the personal interests of the
authors without taking into consideration the balance

required by the American Constitution, the moral right
doctrine in the United States may be unconstitutional.
In the same way, when protecting the personal rights

of authors,

the courts'

analysis of the common law and the

federal unfair competition actions must be done in

accordance with this need of balance and the alliance that
exists between the Copyright Clause and the First

Amendment.

Otherwise, the courts' analysis may also be

unconstitutional
In conclusion,

it can be said that the protection of

the authors' personal rights or right of personality in

America must be considered in conjunction with the balance
between the different rights and the three-constitutional
copyright policies required by the constitutional command.

125 The fundamental purpose of the American Copyright
is to promote the
progress by promoting the public's access to the works in order to
disseminate knowledge.
Thus, the copyright's goal, in short, is to
promote learning.
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B.- The Natural Law Concept and its Inapplicability in the

United States Copyright System

The Continental -moral -right doctrine is based on

natural law principles.

Thus,

the moral rights doctrine or

droit moral "has its philosophical roots buried deeply in
natural law theories that permeate both the later English
and American common law and the natural rights movements of
the eighteenth, nineteenth,

and twentieth centuries." 126

Moreover, since moral rights are based in natural law, the
authors' moral rights are perpetual,

imprescriptible.

inalienable, and

These characteristics of the authors'

moral rights are incompatible with the American statutory

copyright law because the American copyright system has to
deal with the balance of interests required by the

Constitution.

127

Even though American common law recognized that the
common law copyright is based on natural law principles,
the American copyright system has subordinated common law

copyright to statutory copyright 128 in order to provide an

adequate balance of interests in the benefit of the
Copyright Clause's goal:
126 Hauhart,

the promotion of progress.

supra note 37, at 69.

127 For the analysis of the balance
of interests required by the
Constitution, see Chapter II, Section V (A) (1) of this paper.
128 Hauhart,
129 See

supra note 37, at 67.

Copyright Clause, supra note 18.

129

.

.
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The first American case that discussed the natural law

basis for the copyright system was Wheaton

v.

Peters 130

.

it is important to mention here that the

However,

background of the Wheaton

Millar

two English cases:

Beckett 132

Peters case can be found in

v.
v.

Taylor,

131

and Donaldson

v.

.

Millar, a 1769 King's Bench decision, was the earliest

English case that discussed the natural law basis of the

Millar held that an author had

copyright common law.

a

common- law copyright in perpetuity despite the Statute of
Anne.

133

in Millar,

Thus,

"[by]

accepting the claim of the

booksellers, the King's Bench ignored the intentions of the

Statute of Anne 134 to exclude an author's property right." 135
The objective of the Statute of Anne was to destroy

censorship and to promote public access to the authors'
works.

Thus, pursuant to the Statute of Anne,

the

copyright holder was given a right to control the

reproduction of the author's work in exchange for the duty
of returning the work to the public domain after fourteen

130 33

U.S.

(8

Peters)

374

(1834).

131 4

Burr. 2303,

98 Eng.

Rep.

203

132 4

Burr. 2407,
1774)

98 Eng.

Rep.

257; 17 Cobbett s Pari. Hist. Eng.

(H.L.

1769)

953

.

133 Patterson,
134 Statute

(K.B.

supra note 32, at 15.

of Anne,

8

Anne,

c.

19

(1710)

copyright statute)
135 Zimmermann,

supra note 27, at 177

(this is the first English

39

years.

136

After the decision in Millar, this case was
common law

accepted as substantiating the existence of

a

copyright based on natural law principles.

However,

years later, Millar was overruled by Donaldson
In 1774,

the House of Lords in Donaldson

v.
v.

five

Beckett.

Beckett

"held that an author had a common- law copyright in his
works, but only until publication, after which he must look
to the Statute

[of Anne]

for protection." 137

Therefore, the

decision in Donaldson concluded that common law copyright
(based on natural law principles)

had been supplanted by

statutory copyright after the publication of the works.
Thus,

the authors' natural rights embodied in the common

law copyright exist in perpetuity, but those authors'

natural rights cease to exist as soon as the author's work
is published.

This legal fiction occurs because the

authors' act of publication brings into play the people's

right to learn.

138

136

"The intent of the Statute of Anne to destroy censorship and
encourage public access is best seen in the language of the statute's
title:
'An Act for the Encouragment of Learning, by vesting the
copies of printed books in the Authors, or Purchasers, of such copies,
during the Times therein mentioned'." Moreover, "[t]he Statute of
Anne in Section V not only indicates the regulatory nature of the law
but also the overriding importance given to providing sufficient
public access.
This chapter provides penalties for those stationers
who do not provide copies of the book for the various public and
university libraries. Section IV included an added precaution of
extensive price control for the books published." Zimmermann, supra
note 27, at footnotes 66-67.
137 Patterson,
138 See

supra note 32, at 15.

Patterson,

supra note 45, at 25.
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The American Constitutional Convention adopted the

Copyright Clause in 1789.

Because of the influence of

139

the English copyright system,

the language of the Copyright

Clause was drawn from the introduction of the Statute of

Anne 140

,

and the First United States Copyright Act 141 sought

to preserve the regulatory nature of the English copyright

system under the Statute of Anne.

142

Thus,

the first

American copyright case, that discussed the natural law
basis for common law copyright,
in Donaldson v. Beckett.

142

followed the English lead

That case was Wheaton

v.

Peters
Wheaton

v.

Peters discussed the natural -property-right

of the authors which ends at publication by constitutional

Accordingly, the decision in Wheaton

command.

v.

Peters

recognized that the new property right or copyright created
by the statute was not a recognition of the principle that
a man is entitled to the fruits of his labor,

but was

instituted "to promote the progress of science and useful

139 For a

thorough description of the creation of the American Copyright
Clause and the first American copyright law, see Penning, The Origin
of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEORGETOWN
L. J. 109 (1929) cited by Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 178.
Also see
Patterson, supra note 32, at 13-19 (discussing the Adoption of the
Copyright Clause)
i40 See

supra note 136.

141 The

Sess.

First United States Copyright Act,
,

142 See

c.

15

(1790)

Zimmermann,

143 Hauhart,

1

Stat. 124; 1st Cong.,

.

supra note 27, at 178-17 9.

supra note 37, at 67.

2d

s

41

arts" 144

Thus,

.

the decision in Wheaton

v.

Peters 145

illustrates the main difference between the American

copyright system and the Continental author's rights
system.
In conclusion, American common law copyright

recognizes the natural-law-rights of the authors which
could sustain the moral rights doctrine as it is understood
in the Continental author's rights system.

Nevertheless,

the Copyright Clause of the Constitution does not provide

either for the continuation of the common- law copyright or
the continuation of the authors' natural rights embodied in
the common- law copyright; however,

the Copyright Clause

created a new statutory right by its own constitutional
authority.

146

Therefore, the natural law theory is

certainly contrary to the American Copyright Clause and
contrary to the United States Supreme Court decision in
Wheaton

v.

Peters.

Indeed,

the natural law theory is

inapplicable in the United States copyright system.

144 See

U.S. Copyright Clause,

supra note 18.

145

"This case dealt with the controversy arising between two Supreme
Court reporters, Peters and Wheaton.
Peters published his Condensed
Reports which had reported cases in the first volume of Wheaton
reports.
The case presented a question very similar to the one
resolved by the House of Lords in Donaldson. The majority opinion
made it clear that an author has a proprietary right in his work from
the time of its inception, but that the author loses this common law
monopoly when he takes advantage of statutory copyright and publishes.
Once there is publication, protection for the work is found only under
the federal copyright statute."
Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 179'

180.
146 See

Patterson,

supra note 45, at 26

:

4:

C-

Common Law and

The System of Dual Protection:

Statutory Copyright Law

After the above analysis of both the Copyright Clause
and the decision of the Supreme Court in Wheaton

v.

Peters,

it can be sustained that the American-common- law copyright

does recognize the authors' natural rights based on natural
law principles, but these rights end at publication.

Therefore, an author is entitled to the protection

available through the common- law copyright

(until the

publication of his work) and the protection available
through the statutory copyright law.

This system of dual

protection produced two separate concepts of copyright
the common-law copyright and the statutory copyright.
In the case of the moral rights doctrine,

the

distinction between common law and statutory protection
made it difficult to predict exactly when common- law

privileges would be extinguished and when statutory

protection would begin.

This difficulty arises because the

moral rights, pursuant to the author's rights system, are
perpetual,

inalienable, and imprescriptible; and, thus,

they have no possible statutory limits.

For this reason,

the moral rights doctrine cannot be applied in the context
of the American copyright system.

On the contrary,

in the

context of the American copyright system, we should discuss

personal rights protection instead of moral rights.
if a work represents its author's personality,

Thus,

the work

43

should be protected, but this protection must be limited
(after publication)

by the Copyright Clause principles.

The system of dual protection also explains why the

author's right of personality might be protected by other

common-law actions in the United States.
law torts of defamation,

Since the common-

the common- law right of privacy,

the common-law right of publicity,

the common-law unfair

competition, and misappropiation are not preempted by the

Copyright Act, these common- law doctrines could be used to

protect the author's personal rights in the work.

However,

the courts' application of these common-law doctrines must

consider not only the Copyright Clause but also the First

Amendment implications.

Only in this way will the authors'

right of personality be considered as another means to

balance the different rights interacting in the copyright
field.

Chapter III
The Protection of the Author's Right of Per sonali ty in the

United St ates Copyright System

Authors tend to have economic as well personal
interests in their creations.

Hence,

if a work is the

expression of the creative personality of its author, the
work should be protected provided that the aforesaid

protection be considered in connection with the Copyright
Clause's objective and the First Amendment's principles.
Therefore, it is important to state that we are not against
the protection of the authors' personal rights, but rather

that nobody should accept the violation of constitutional

policies, especially if those policies were thought to

benefit the society.
The need to protect the link that exists between the

artist and his work is not a new concept in American law.
In the past,

courts have at times protected authors'

personality interests in their works.

Such protection

could be sought by using some state common law theories

147

"The torts of violation of the right of privacy and defamation per
se are examples of causes of action that protect the plaintiff
interest in his 'honor', an aspect of the right of personality."
Hearings on S. 1198 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and
Trademarks, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess 33
(1989) (statement of Edward J. Damich, Professor of Law, on the VARA
Senate Hearings)
'

.
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147

.

,

.
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(i.e.,

unfair competition, defamation, and invasion of

privacy)

148
.

I.- Authors

1

Personal Rights that could be Protected in the

United States Copyright System

The Berne Convention only requires the protection of
the paternity right

(attribution right) and the integrity

right as the minimun standard for moral rights

protection.

149

Moreover, article 6bis

(3)

of the Berne

Convention states that "[t]he means of redress for

safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be

governed by the legislation of the country where protection
is claimed." 150

Therefore, the United States does not have

to accept the Continental Moral Rights Doctrine,

as it has

been claimed by the civil law countries, to comply with the
Berne minimun standard.
As mentioned in the preceding chapter,

there are four

main rights embodied in the moral rights doctrine.

They

the Right of Disclosure, the Right of Attribution,

are:

the Right of Integrity (against mutilation and distortion)

and the Right of Retraction.

148 See

generally Davis, supra note 97.

149 Berne
150 Id.

Each of these rights could be

,

Convention,
art. 6bis

(3)

supra note

5,

art 6bis

(1)

.
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protected not only by different common law actions but by
the federal unfair competition law 151

II.- Protection of Authors

1

.

Personal Rights in the United

States Copyright System

A.- The Right of Disclosure

The right of disclosure recognizes that the author has
the privilege of determining when to release his work.

The

basis of this right is the idea that the author is the sole
judge of whether and when his work may be brought to the

knowledge of the public. 152

The right of disclosure has

been called the right of first publication, and it "is

nothing other than an American analog to France's droit de
divulgation." 153
(3)

In the American copyright law,

Section 106

of the Copyright Act of 1976 recognizes the right to

distribute copies of the copyrighted work to the public.
This section of the Copyright Act "has been identified as
the statutory enactment of the common- law right of first

publication.

Therefore, the right of disclosure could be

protected by the common law copyright until publication,
after which it will be protected by the statute.
151 See

Lanham Act, supra note 96.
Damich, supra note 56.
Also see Michael C. Perm, Colorization
of Films: Painting a Moustache on the 'Mona Lisa'?, 58 Cin. L. Rev.
1023, at 1027-1028 (1990)
152 See

153 Nimmer,

supra note 87, at

§

8D.05

[A].

s
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The United States Supreme Court found that the right
of first public distribution has two aspects:

the personal

aspect of creative control and the economic aspect of

publishing first.
&

Row Publishers

154

v.

Moreover, the Supreme Court in Harper

Nation Enters. 155 "held that under

ordinary circumstances, the author's right to control the
first public appearance of his undisseminated expression

will outweigh a claim of fair use." 156

In Harper & Row,

the

Supreme Court upheld the natural law theory in order to

protect not only the personal interest in creative control
but also the economic interest in exploitation of

prepublication rights without taking into consideration the
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment implications.

problem in the Harper & Row decision is not the Court

The

'

conclusion, but rather the wrong analysis that allowed the

Court to reach the conclusion.

We should remember that,

when protecting the personal rights of authors, the courts'
analysis of both common law and statutary copyright law
must be done in accordance with the Copyright Clause and
the First Amendment principles.

154

"The author's control of first public distribution implicates not
only his personal interest in the creative control but his property
interest in exploitation of prepublication rights." Harper & Row
Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555 (1985).
lss Id.
156 Nimmer,

supra note 87, at

§

8D.05[A].
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B.- The Right of Attribution

The right of attribution gives the author the right to

have his work attributed to him (or not, as the case where
he wishes to be anonymous or to employ a pseudonym)

157
.

This right allows the author to present himself to the

public as the creator of a work, to require others to

acknowledge his authorship, and to prevent others from

attributing works to the author which he did not
originate.

158

This right is well-recognized within the

United States copyright system.

159

The right of attribution or paternity right could be

protected by the common-law right of privacy, the commonlaw right of publicity, and section 43
For example,

Act.

section 43

(a)

(a)

of the Lanham

of the Lanham Act "may be

invoked whenever an author's composition is published

without being accompanied by his name." 160

Thus,

if the

name of an author is substituted for another's name as the

author of a work, such a conduct would constitute a false

designation of origin or false representation within the

157 Damich,
158 Penn,

supra note56, at

7.

supra note 152, at 1028

159

"The volume of U.S. case law that [exists] under the rubrics of
attribution and integrity leaves no doubt that each of those rights is
anything but orphaned within the legal framework of the United
States." Nimmer, supra note 87, at § 8D.02[D].
160 Id.

,

at

§

8D.03

[A] [2]

.

49

meaning of section 43
v.

Montoro

(a)

The leading case here is Smith

.

161
.

An author's attribution right could also be violated
if he is designated as an author of a work in which he has

not contributed.

162

in Follett v. Arbor House

Thus,

Publishing Co. 163 the court found that false attribution
also constitutes a false description or representation in

violation of Section 43

of the Lanham Act.

(a)

164

Other theories have been invoked in order to protect
the right of paternity.

These theories are:

defamation,

invasion of the right of privacy, and breach of contract.
There is defamation "when the work falsely attributed
to the author is of an inferior quality and consequently

There is an invasion of the

damages his reputation." 165
161 648

F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981) ("In this case, the plaintiff, an actor
who starred in a motion picture distributed by the defendant, claimed
a violation of his rights under Section 43 (a) by reason of
defendant s deletion of his name from the film credits and
accompanying advertising material, and its substitution of the name of
another actor in such credits and advertisements. In reversing the
district court's dismissal of the Lanham Act claim, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that reverse passing off, which consists of the unauthorized
removal or obliteration of the original trademark on goods produced by
another before the resale of such goods, constitutes a violation of
Section 43(a).
The court thereupon found defendant's conduct to
constitute a false designation of origin, or false representation
within the meaning of Section 43 (a)
The court further concluded that
such false designation or representation occurs when the name of
another is substituted for the plaintiff's name as the star of a
motion picture")
Nimmer, supra note 87, at § 8D.03[A] [2]
'

.

.

162 Id.

at

,

§

8D.03

163 497

F

164 See

Nimmer,

165 Id.

supp.

.

[B]

304

.

(S.D.N.Y.

1980).

supra note 87, at

§

8D.03[B]

.

Also see Clevenger v. Baker, Voorhis & Co., 8 N.Y.2d 187
and Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co., 251 N.Y. 250 (1929).

(1960)

50

right of privacy when the author's name is used in false

attribution.

166

There is a breach of contract if the

defendant is contractually obligated to give the author
'credit'

in connection with his work,

does not fulfill his obligation.

C-

but the defendant

167

The Right of Integrity

The right of integrity prohibits any change

(distortion or modification)

in a work without the author's

consent, provided that such distortion or modification

would constitute a misrepresentation of the author's
artistic expression.

168

The right of integrity,

"like the

other moral rights, is held by the creator, and is
independent of any economic rights that he may or may not
have in the work." 169
The right of integrity could be protected by commonlaw unfair competition and section 43
Act.

170

(a)

of the Lanham

The leading case here is Gilliam v. American

Broadcasting Companies (ABC). 111
166 Nimmer,

supra note 87, at § 8D.03[B].
House Publishing Co., supra note 163.

The court in Gilliam held
Also see Follett

v.

Arbor

161 Id.
168 Penn,

supra note 152, at 1028.

169 Jd.

170 Damich,
171 538

supra note 56, at 61.

F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
In Gilliam, the court ruled that
deleting 27% of the work grossly altered the work and constituted a

.
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"that unauthorized changes in the work that are so

extensive as to impair the integrity of the original work
constitute copyright infringement." 172

The Gilliam court

justified its holding by stating that presenting a

distorted version of the work to the public should be
recognized as declaring a cause of action under the Lanham
Act

§

43(a).

173

Thus,

the decision in Gilliam stated that:

"American copyright law, as presently written, does

not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of

action for their violation, since the law seeks to

vindicate the economic, rather than the personal,
Nevertheless,

rights of authors.

the economic

incentive for artistic and intellectual creation that
serves as the foundation for American copyright law

mutilation in violation of the copyright license.
In Gilliam, "the
group of British writers and performers known as Monty Python sued ABC
to enjoin their broadcasting of edited versions of three Monty Python
programs originally written and produced for the British Broadcasting
Corporation (the BBC)
Under its contract with the BBC, Monty Python
had broad rights to oversee changes in the scripts the BBC had the
right to make only 'minor changes' without the writers approval and
had no right to alter the programs after recording.
The BBC, however,
did have the right to license overseas showings of the programs
Subject to the agreement, Monty Python retained all the rights in the
scripts.
One of the Monty Python group members, Mr. Terry Gilliam,
brought suit against ABC, claiming that the broadcast of these
programs as edited would constitute an infringement of the group's
copyright in the underlying script, unfair competition, and a
violation of the group's moral right of integrity. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals agreed with Gilliam and upheld the lower court's
grant of a preliminary injunction."
See Anna S. White, The
Colorization Dispute: Moral Rights Theory as a Means of Judicial and
Legislative Reform, 38 Emory L. J. 237, at 263 (1989)
.

;

.

172 Nimmer,
112 Gilliam,

supra note 87, at

§

538 F.2d at 24-25.

8D.04[A]

s
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cannot be reconciled with the inability of artists to

obtain relief for mutilation or misrepresentation of
their work to the public on which the artists are

financially dependent.

Thus,

courts have long granted

relief for misrepresentation of an artist s work by
'

relying on theories outside the statutory law of
copyright .. .Although such decisions are clothed in
terms of proprietary right in one's creation,

they

also properly vindicate the author's personal right to

prevent the presentation of his work to the public in
a distorted form.

.

.

[Section 43

(a)

of the Lanham Act]

has been invoked to prevent misrepresentations that

may injure plaintiff
reputation.
a

..

'

s

business or personal

It is sufficient to violate the Act that

representation of a product, although technically

true,

creates a false impression of the product

origin.

.

.Thus,

'

an allegation that a defendant has

presented to the public a 'garbled' distorted version
of plaintiff s work seeks to redress the very rights
'

sought to be protected by the Lanham Act,

.

.

.and should

be recognized as stating a cause of action under that
statute.

However,

" 174

it is important to point out that even though

the court's language in Gilliam was very supportive of

moral rights protection for authors, the decision in

114 Gilliam,

538 F.2d at 24-25

(citations omitted)

,

.
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Gilliam ultimately relied on the contractual provisions and
the fact that the plaintiff was the owner of the copyright
in the underlying scripts

175
.

D.- The Right of Retraction

The right of retraction permits the author,

after

publication, to stop the further distribution of his work
or to make changes in it.

176

The right of retraction is the

analog to France's droit de retrait.

111

This right would

allow the author to prevent the exercise of copyright after
the transfer of the rights conferred by the copyright.

In

terms of American copyright law, the right of retraction

would be protected only by the termination right, section
203 of the Copyright Act of 1976.

178

175 Dana L.

Burton, Artists' Moral Rights:
Controversy and the Visual
Artists Rights Act, 48 SMU L. Rev. 639, at 650 (1995)
176 Damich,

supra note 56, at

7.

177 Nimmer,

supra note 87, at

§

8D.05[B]

178 For a

more pointed analysis of this issue, see Craig Joyce et al
Copyright Law § 5.02 (3d ed. 1994).

.

Chapter IV

Constitutionality of the Continental Moral Rights Doctrine
in the Unit ed States Copyright System

The continental author's rights system, based on

natural law principles, focuses on the authors' rights

without taking into consideration other rights that come
into play when a work is published.

The fundamental goal

of the continental author's rights system is the protection
of the authors'

rights:

rights or moral rights.

economic as well as personal
On the other hand, the essential

objective of the American copyright system is "[t]o promote
the Progress" 179 in the ultimate benefit of the society.

180

Therefore, the American copyright laws cannot focus only in
the authors' rights since the promotion of progress could
not be achieved without the dissemination of knowledge;
and,

the true dissemination of knowledge is impossible

without the guarantee embodied in the free speech provision
of the First Amendment.

Moreover,

the dissemination of

knowledge could not be accomplished if the people's right
to learn is not guaranteed as well as the public access to

179 Copyright

Clause,

supra note 18.

180

"The underlying purpose of the federal copyright system- -to promote
the Progress- -focuses more on social utility than on authors'
personalities." Ciolino, supra note 58, at 949.

54

-

.
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others'

ideas.

Thus,

"a

copyright may conflict with the

Constitution's protections of free speech when copyright is
used to inhibit the free flow of information." 181
In the same approach,

the balance between the author's

natural property right and the people

'

s

natural right to

learn is only possible through the formulation of a

positive-law doctrine.

182

Since,

in the case of the

American copyright system, the Constitution is the
foundation on which the positive-copyright-law doctrine is
based, we should consider not only the Copyright Clause but

also the First Amendment when analyzing all copyright
issues
In this chapter,

this paper discusses that the

continental moral rights doctrine may conflict not only

with American copyright principles, such as the fair use
doctrine, but also with the First Amendment.

The First

Amendment and the fair use doctrine, which are essential
elements in the American copyright system, have not been

contemplated either by the Berne Convention or by the
Continental Law System.

Moreover, there are scholars who

disfavor more extensive protection of authors' moral
rights.

These scholars consider that:

first,

"moral

rights laws would be doctrinally inconsistent with American

copyright law and property law that generally promote,

181 Zimmermann,
182 See

supra note 27, at 164

Patterson,

supra note 45.

"

56

rather than limit, commerce in information and property;
second, moral rights would threaten economic investment in
the arts and thus stifle artistic creativity; and third,

moral rights would breed cultural conservatism,

threaten

editorial freedom, and grant artists unnecessarily broad

aesthetic vetoes." 183

Consequently, the moral rights

doctrine as known in the Civil Law Countries may be

unconstitutional in the United States copyright system.

I.

-

Fair use

The doctrine of fair use 184

,

codified in

§

107 of the

Copyright Act, is "the method chosen by lawmakers and
courts to deal with the tension between free speech and

copyright protection." 185

Moreover,

since the statutory

copyright grants to the authors the copyright protection
for a specified period 186

forth in

§

(with the exclusive privileges set

106 of the Copyright Act)

,

the copyright term

"created a substantial risk to the public's accessibility

183 Ciolino,

supra note 58, at 957.
See also generally, Kelly, supra
note 111; and Zimmermann, supra note 27.
184 Fair

Use Doctrine,

supra note 80

185 The

fair use doctrine "establishes the delicate balance between the
public's interest in access to a work and the copyright owner's
interest in profit, and has been seen by the courts as a method of
eliminating potential conflicts between copyright and free speech.
Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 165.

^3 duration of the copyright, see Sections 302-305 of the
Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 22.
i86 For
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to the copyrighted work"
a

187
;

thus,

the fair use doctrine "is

means of resolving this problem by making the copyrighted

work accessible for learning." 188

the fair use

Therefore,

doctrine is an important principle, which is used to
support the regulatory nature of copyright 189

,

with the

function to allow the public's access to information.
The Continental Moral Rights Doctrine focuses on the

proprietary concept of copyright rather than on the
regulatory concept that the copyright has in the United
States system.

190

Therefore,

in the American copyright

system, the copyright owner does not have complete control

over all possible uses of his work.

191

On the other hand,

the moral right doctrine allows the author to control the

use of his work even after the transfer of the copyright.

187 Patterson,

supra note 45, at 35

188 Patterson,

supra note 45, at 35

189

"The distinction between a proprietary and a regulatory concept of
copyright and its application to the public access goal of copyright
was originated by L. Ray Patterson, Professor of Law, [The University
of Georgia School of Law]
The public access problem in copyright law
is a result of treating copyright protection as property.
An
application of copyright law focusing on the need for public access
for a particular work requires that copyright be viewed as a
'regulatory' concept, not a 'proprietary' concept.
If a copyright is
treated as a piece of property the copyright owner is given extremely
expansive rights in the work, thus allowing the copyright owner to
substantially control public access to the work and have the power of
censorship over that work." Zimmermann, supra note 27, at 165-166.
.

190

"The Supreme Court acknowledged that copyright is a regulatory
concept created to promote public access to information in the
landmark case of Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)."
Id.
191 See

Sony,

464 U.S. at 432.
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While the fair use doctrine makes

a

copyrighted work

accessible during the term of the copyright's protection,
the moral right of integrity could threaten the criticism
of a work because the author of the work could claim that

the critique about his work constitutes a distortion or

mutilation of his work.

192

Futhermore, while the "fair use

doctrine is the means by which the economic monopoly

granted to a copyright owner is made secondary to the
public's interest in the free flow of information" 193

,

the

moral rights doctrine makes the author's control over the

work its principal axiom.
It is clear at this point that the Continental Moral

Rights Doctrine is incompatible with the American fair use
However, the question arises regarding both the

doctrine.

Section 106A of the Copyright Act 194 and the common- law

protection of the author's right of personality.
The moral rights given by Section 106A of the

Copyright Act are subject to the fair use defense pursuant
to Section 107.

However,

"the House Report states that it

is unlikely that such a defense will be successful." 195

Moreover, Section 106A is unclear as to what specifically

192 Criticism is one of the possible purposes that
justify a fair use of
a copyrighted work.
See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1976)
.

193 Zimmermann,

supra note 27, at 190-191.

194 17

106A (1976).

U.S.C.

195 Kelly,

§

supra note 111.

See also supra note 99.
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would constitute prejudice to the honor or reputation of
the artist.

if a professor uses a work of visual

Hence,

art in a classroom in order to teach,

the author of the

work could claim that the use of his work is damaging his
honor and reputation.
In the case of the protection of the author's right of

personality through state common law theories and the
federal unfair competition law, the courts' analysis must
be considered in conjunction with the fair use doctrine and

the First Amendment principles in order to avoid

unconstitutional decisions.

II.- Idea-Expression Dichotomy

In the American copyright system,

the idea-expression

dichotomy doctrine 196 has been seen as another means to
accomplish the Copyright Clause objective.
102

(b)

Thus,

Section

of the Copyright Act 197 protects an author's

expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves.

The idea-

expression dichotomy doctrine balances the interests of the
author while maintaining a source of information for the

public and other authors.

196 See
197 17

supra note 25.
U.S.C.

198 Kelly,

§

102

(b)

(1976)

supra note 111.

198

The ideas are in the public

.
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domain once they are published so that the public's access
to the ideas is guaranteed.

The Continental Moral Rights Doctrine is based on

natural rights principles that support the concept that the

author is the sole owner of his creation (including the
ideas since they are the product of the author's thoughts)

Therefore, the American idea-expression dichotomy doctrine
is incompatible with the moral rights doctrine,

and its

application would be endangered by the moral rights
doctrine based on natural law rights.

III.- The First Amendment 199

The fundamental purpose of the American copyright

system is to promote progress by promoting the public's
access to the works in order to disseminate knowledge.
However, if we want to guarantee the freedom of access to
an author's ideas, we have to guarantee the freedom to

express these ideas.

The purpose of the First Amendment is

to guarantee freedom of expression.

Therefore, the

Copyright Clause and the First Amendment are in fact parts
of the same constitutional policy.

200

The difference is

199 U.S. Const, amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.").
200 Zimmermann,

supra note 27, at 171.

61

that the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment each take
a

distinct approach to the protection of public's access to

information.

The First Amendment "uses political

protections, while the Copyright Clause uses an economic

incentive to authors to promote public access to
information." 201

Thus,

both the Copyright Clause and the

First Amendment ensure not only the balance among the

different rights involved in the dissemination of knowledge
but also guarantee the final purpose of the American

copyright system.
The First Amendment principle of protection of the

free speech has not been contemplated either by the

Continental moral rights doctrine or by the Berne
Convention.

Thus,

the Continental moral rights doctrine,

which is recognized by the Berne Convention, has never
taken into consideration the relationship that exists

between the protection of the author's rights and the
public's access to information and, thus, knowledge.
Therefore,

in the moral rights doctrine,

it is not an issue

that the author could be able to control the public access
to his work by exercising a perpetual,

inalienable, and

imprescriptible proprietary right over his work and his
ideas.

However,

201 Political

in the American copyright system,

if the

protections are those "enforced by the courts and by
legislative actions as opposed to any economic incentive.
The
economic incentive created by a copyright is in the form of protection
of an author's profit as provided by the copyright laws."
Zimmermann,
supra note 27, at 170.
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"copyright owner is able to control public access to a
work,

he

[could be]

in violation of the Constitution's

guarantee of freedom of expression as well as the Copyright
Clause's goal of promotion of public access." 202
In conclusion,

the moral rights doctrine conflicts

with the Constitution's protections of free speech as

embodied in the First Amendment.

Hence, when the moral

rights are used to inhibit the free flow of information,
its use may be unconstitutional.

IV.- The Moral Rights Characteristics

Pursuant to the Author's right system, the moral
rights are perpetual, inalienable, and imprescriptible.
These characteristics are incompatible with the American

copyright system.
The Copyright Clause only authorizes for "limited

Times" the statutory protection of the authors' rights.
Thus,

203

Congress is given by the Copyright Clause a broad

basis for determining the duration of the copyright
protection.

However, any federal statute enacted under the

Copyright Clause, which granted a moral right in
perpetuity, would be unconstitutional.

202 Zimmermann,
203 U.S.
204i
'Penn,

204

Therefore, the

supra note 27, at 186.

Const. Art

I,

§

8,

cl

.

8.

supra note 152, at 1036.

See supra note 18.

.
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perpetual characteristic of the moral rights doctrine would
be incompatible with the American copyright system.

Furthermore,

the rights granted by the American statutory-

copyright-law are alienable and prescriptible

Chapter V

Conclusions

In order to achieve an international framework which

could provide a minimum standard of protection for its

copyrightable works, the United States acceded to the Berne
Convention, and Congress passed the Berne Convention

Implementation Act.

The Berne Convention provides the

highest copyright protection available at the international
level.

However, the adherence of the United States to this

treaty has caused some controversy especially in the moral
rights field.

Thus,

the adherence of the United States to

the Berne Convention has brought a clash of the two systems

involved in the international copyright field:

the

Copyright system, and the Author's Rights system.

Despite the efforts of the United States in the
international copyright field, some countries in Europe and
in Latin America claim that the copyright system in the

United States does not protect in an appropriate way the
personal rights of authors or moral rights.

However, this

critique and misunderstanding regarding the protection of
the moral rights in the United States is produced by a

wrong interpretation of the differences between the

American copyright system and the Continental author's
rights system.

The Berne Convention's countries should

64

.
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consider that, in the case of moral rights, there are

philosophical and constitutional differences between the

American copyright law and the Civil law countries system.
Therefore, an understanding of the real objectives of the

American constitutional copyright provision, and the
particular characteristics of the United States copyright
system will enable Congress to avoid,
field,

in the moral rights

future amendments to the American copyright law that

may be unconstitutional.
The Berne Convention moral rights are based on natural

law principles.

The natural rights approach adopted in the

Continental law system sustains that the "authors always

retained their personal or moral rights even if they sold
their economic rights." 205

Thus,

the ultimate purpose of

the author's rights or Droit d' Auteur system is the

inviolability of an author's personality.
hand,

On the other

the ultimate purpose of the American copyright system

is "to promote the Progress of Science" 206 or,

in other

words, to encourage the production of "science and useful

arts" 207 as a means "to promote the Progress" 208 and the

welfare of the nation.
law,

Hence,

in the American copyright

the economic protection provided to the owner of the

copyright is the means of the copyright law not its goal
205 Burger,
206 U.S.

207 Jd
206 Id.

supra note 30, at

Const, art.

I,

§

8,

6.

cl

.

8.

See supra note 18
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Consequently, the purpose of the Continental moral rights

doctrine is incompatible with the American copyright
system.

American copyright system found that the author's act
of publication brings into play the rights of others.

In

consequence, the Framers of the Constitution faced the fact
that two different natural law concepts came into conflict:

that of the author's natural property right,

people's natural right to learn. 209

Thus,

and the

the only method

available to balance two different natural laws in
conflict, without placing one above the other,
the creation of a positive-law doctrine.
the American copyright system,

is through

In the case of

the Constitution is the

foundation in which the positive -copyright -law doctrine is
based.

Thus,

the natural -property-right of the authors

ends at publication by constitutional command.

In this

way, American common law copyright does recognize the

natural-law-rights of the authors which could sustain the
moral rights doctrine as it is understood in the

Continental author's rights system.

Nevertheless, the

Copyright Clause of the Constitution does not provide

either for the continuation of the common- law copyright or
the continuation of the authors' natural rights embodied in
the common-law copyright; however,

the Copyright Clause

created a new statutory right by its own constitutional

209 See

Patterson,

supra note 45.

authority.

Therefore,

in which the

the natural law theory,

moral rights doctrine is based,

is inapplicable in the

United States copyright system as it was recognized by the
United States Supreme Court decision in Wheaton
Peters 210

v.

.

The purpose of the Copyright Clause is to balance the

different natural laws in conflict in order to promote the

progress of the society.

However, the Copyright Clause is

not enough to ensure the complete balance required by the

important rights involved in the copyright field.
Therefore, the ultimate goal of the copyright

(to promote

the progress by promoting the public's access to the works
in order to disseminate knowledge)

is clearly meaningless

if with this freedom of access to the knowledge does not

also come the freedom to express the ideas and the

knowledge which is guaranteed by the First Amendment. 211
The First Amendment principle of protection of the
free speech has not been contemplated either by the

Continental moral rights doctrine or by the Berne
Convention.

Thus,

the Continental moral rights doctrine,

which is recognized by the Berne Convention, has never
taken into consideration the relationship that exists

between the protection of the author's rights and the
public's access to information and, thus, knowledge.

210 33

U.S.

(8

211 Zimmermann,

Peters)

374

(1834).

supra note 27, at 164

.
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Therefore,

the moral rights doctrine conflicts with the

Constitution's protections of free speech as embodied in
the First Amendment.

After the analysis made in this paper,

it can be

stated that the Continental moral rights doctrine is also

incompatible with both the American fair use doctrine 212 and
the idea-expression dichotomy doctrine 213

.

The only idea that connects American right of

personality and the concept of moral rights in the
Continental legal system is that the works are expressions
of the creative personality of the authors,

and insofar as

these works represent the authors' personalities, the works

should be protected.

However,

because of the

philosophical differences between the American copyright
law and the author's rights system, the U.S. consistently
has refused to recognize moral rights, as such, but through

various common law doctrines, such as defamation,
misrepresentation, the right of privacy, the right of
publicity, unfair competition, and federal claims such as

section 43

(a)

of the Lanham act 214

upheld claims of moral right. 215

212 For

the analysis of this issue,

,

courts frequently have

Therefore,

it can be said

see Chapter IV, Section

I

of this

paper
213 For a

more pointed analysis of this issue, see Chapter IV, Section

II of this paper.
214 Lanham

215 See

Act,

15 U.S.C.A.

§§ 1051 et seq.

generally Damich, supra note 56; and Davis, supra note 97.

.
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that the U.S. does fulfill the minimum standard of moral

rights' protection which the Berne Convention requires.

Nevertheless, the courts' analysis of the common law and
the federal unfair competition actions must be done in

accordance with the need of balance and the alliance that
exists between the Copyright Clause and the First
Amendment.

Otherwise, the courts' analysis may be also

unconstitutional
Finally,
paper,

after all the considerations made in this

it concludes that the moral rights concept,

as

understood in the Civil Law Countries, may be
unconstitutional in the United States copyright system.

Bibliography

-

Donald

E.

Biederman et al

.

Law and Business of the

,

Entertainment Industries (Praeger ed.
-

Donald

E.

Biederman et al

.

3d ed.

,

Law and Business of the

,

Entertainment Industries (Praeger ed.

2d ed.

,

-

Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990).

-

Peter Burger,

Dana

L.

3

J.

L.

& Tech.

1

(1988)

Dane

S.

.

Burton, Artists' Moral Rights: Controversy and

The Visual Artists Rights Act, 48 SMU L. Rev.
-

1996).

The Berne Convention: Its History and Its

Key Role in the Future,
-

1996).

639

(1995)

Ciolino, Moral Rights and Real Obligations

:

.

A

Property-Law Framework for the Protection of Authors' Moral
Rights,
-

69 Tul

.

Rev.

L.

935

(1995).

Karen Y. Crabbs, The Future of Authors' and Artists'

Moral Rights in America, 26 Beverly Hills B. A. J. 167
(1992)
-

.

Edward

J.

Damich,

The Right of Personality: A Common-Law

Basis for the Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23
Ga.
-

L.

Rev.

(1988)

.

Robert Davenport, Screen Credit in the Entertainment

Industry,
-

1

10 Loyola Entert

.

L.

J.

129

(1990).

Sophia Davis, State Moral Rights Law and The Federal

Copyright System,

4

Cardozo Arts & Ent

70

.

L.

J.

233

(1985).

.

.

.

71
-

Adolf Dietz, ALAI Congress: Antwers 1993 The Moral Rights

of the Authors: Moral Rights and the Civil Law Countries,

Colum.-VLA

19
-

J.

Gerald Dworkin,

Arts 199

&

L.

(1995).

The Moral Rights of the Author: Moral

Rights and the Common Law Countries,
Arts 229
-

19

Colum.-VLA

L.

J.

&

(1995)

Bernand Edelman, Applicable Legislation Regarding

Exploitation of Colourized U.S. Films in France: The 'John
Huston' Case, 23 IIC 629
-

(1992).

Jimmy A. Frazier, On Moral Rights, Artist-Centered

Legislation, and the Role of the State in Art Worlds: Notes
on Building a Sociology of Copyright Law,
313
-

70 Tul

.

Rev.

L.

(1995)

Robert

C.

Hauhart

Natural Law Basis for the Copyright

,

Doctrine of Droit Moral,
-

Craig Joyce et al

-

Robert A. Jacobs,

.,

The Catholic Lawyer 53

3

Copyright Law (3d ed. 1994)

(1985)

.

.

Work- for -Hire and the Moral Rights

Dilemma in the European Community: A U.S. Perspective, 16
Boston College Int
-

•

1

.

& Comp.

L.

Rev.

29

(1993).

Kathryn A. Kelly, Moral Rights and the First Amendment:

Putting Honor before Free Speech?, 11 U. Miami Ent
Sports L. Rev. 211
-

.

&

(1994)

John M. Kernochan, Ownership and Control of Intellectual

Property Rights in Audiovisual Works: Contracts and
Practice-Report to the ALAI Congress, Paris, September 20,
1995,

20 Colum.-VLA J.

L.

&

Arts 359

(1996)

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

72
-

Daniel McKendree Sessa, Moral Right Protections in the

Colorization of Black and White Motion Pictures

and White Issue, 16 Hofstra
-

L.

Rev.

503

:

A Black

(1988)

Congressional Limits on Technological

Janine V. McNally,

Alterations to Film: The Public Interest and The Artists'
Moral Rights,
-

63

Carlos

J.

Moorhead,

(Vol.

2

L.

J.

& Tech.

187

(1988)

L.

Vanderbilt

L.

Rev.

Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech (Student

B.

Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright

J.

1

Copyright and 'The Exclusive Right' of

Intell. Prop. L.

1

(1993).

Ray Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use,

Michael

L.
C.

Rev.

1

Penn,

(1987)

Colorization of Films: Painting a

Moustache on the 'Mona Lisa'?, 58 Cin.
-

48

B.

Ray Patterson,

40 Vand.
-

3

1996)

Authors,
-

Intell.

1984)

Melville

L.

4

(1995)

Melville

ed.

-

.

The Berne Convention Implementation

David Nimmer, The End of Copyright,

1385

-

(1990)

(1989)

Act of 1987,

-

129

'Film Colorization' Debate: An Applied Study,

Prop. J.

-

J.

L.

Jeffrey Meade, Moral Rights in Intellectual Property and

the

-

High Tech.

5

L.

Rev.

1023

(1990).

Laura A. Pitta, Economic and Moral Rights under U.S.

Copyright Law: Protecting Authors and Producers in the

Motion Picture Industry, 12 Entert

.

Sports Lawyer

3

(1995).

:

.

73
-

Cathy Seidner

&

Kimon

P.

Editing Films for TV, 203 N.Y.
-

Brett Sirota,

Johanna

F.

L.

J.

5

(1990)

Stewart,

Rev.

L.

461

-

(1992)

.

The Freelancer s Trap: Work for Hire
'

under the Copyright Act of 1976, 86 W. Va
(1984)

.

The Visual Artists Act: Federal Versus

State Moral Rights, 21 Hofstra
-

The Moral -Rights Issue in

Timon,

.

L.

Rev.

13 05

.

Anna

White,

S.

The Colorization Dispute: Moral Rights

Theory as a Means of Judicial and Legislative Reform,
Emory
-

L.

Stephen

Avoiding
(1986)
-

237

J.
S.

a

38

(1989)

Zimmermann, A Regulatory Theory of Copyright

First Amendment Conflict,

35

Emory

L.

J.

163

.

Joseph Zuber, The Visual Artists Act of 1990-What it

Does, and What it Preempts,

23 Pac

.

L.

J.

445

(1992)

.

iLAW LIBRA!,

UNIVERSE of GFO

*

/

-

°

n

(

JAN

2 S

«»

FOR

LI

USE

